Education: Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1984 Fields of Interest: Game Theory, Mathematical Economics Selected Research:
“Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria and the Probabilistic Prospects of Stackelberg Players,” Operations Research Letters, 38, (2010), 94-96.
“Individually Rational Pure Strategies in Large Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 47, (2004) 221-233.
“On Comparing Equilibrium and Optimum Payoffs in a Class of Discrete Bimatrix Games,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 39, (2000), pp. 13-20.
“The Limit Distribution of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 21 (1996), pp. 726-733.
“Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,” (with Ehud Kalai), Econometrica, 56 (1988), pp. 397-410. Current Research Interests:
Repeated games - Issues of strategic and computational complexity
Probabilistic Aspects of Game Theory Solution Concepts Other Significant Accomplishments:
National Science Foundation Grant, Economics Unit, Grant No. -8720334, 1988-1990